Weil and several seminar participants for useful comments and suggestions. All errors are ours.
past income is controlled for, the e®ect of more recent levels of income on the probability of using punchcard machines becomes negative.
Introduction
The bizarre turn of events that followed the November 7, 2000 presidential election brought unprecedented attention to the use of di®erent voting equipment in the United States. In particular, the reading of punchcard ballots in a few Florida counties became the subject of heated legal disputes that ended with a controversial U.S. Supreme Court ruling on December 12, 2000. During the Florida crisis the media was¯lled with detailed reports on the mechanics of di®erent voting equipment. Colorful expressions, such as \hanging chads" and \pregnant chads," entered the national vocabulary.
1 That crisis has spurred an ongoing debate on voting equipment choice and election reform. Proposals to develop national or state standards for conducting elections and to fund voting equipment upgrades have been introduced in the U.S. Congress and in numerous state capitals. Voting equipment has moved from being a minor, local aspect of elections to representing an important national issue.
A striking aspect of voting equipment usage in the U.S. is its heterogeneity.
All sorts of systems are used across the nation. American voters mark paper ballots, pull levers, punch cards,¯ll optically-readable forms, or touch electronic screens. Data obtained from Election Data Services (EDS) show the following distribution of voting equipment types across counties in 1999: optical scanners 38.8 % of counties; punchcard machines 20.2 %; electronic machines 8.2 %; lever 1 For an explanation of this terminology, see Section 2. machines 15.3 %; paper ballots 13.1 %. The distribution as a percentage of registered voters was: punchcard machines 34.1 %; optical 27.6 %; lever 18.5 %; electronic 9.1 %; paper 1.6 %.
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The machines currently in use are based on technologies spanning over a century. Optical and electronic machines have been adopted since the late 1970s.
Punchcard voting machines were¯rst introduced in 1964. Lever machines werē rst used in statewide elections in 1892. In fact, virtually each type of voting equipment ever introduced in the U.S. since the 19th century is still used somewhere in the country. 3 More detailed information on the history and characteristics of voting equipment is reported in Section 2.
Such heterogeneity is partly the result of decentralization. While many other democracies have uni¯ed national voting systems, in the U.S. choices over voting equipment are highly decentralized -mostly at the county and municipal level. The question is worth addressing for at least two reasons:
2 The remaining 4.5 % of counties, containing 9.1 % of registered voters, used`mixed systems' (i.e., two or more types of equipment). 3 Our main source for historical information is the Federal Election Commission (www.fec.gov/elections.html). 4 Heterogeneity is only minimally reduced within states. In Pennsylvania, Virginia and several other states each type of available equipment is used by one or more counties.
1) Voting equipment matters. While the Supreme Court decision in December
2000 ended the legal battle over the recounting of votes in a few Florida counties, the debate over the causes and consequences of voting equipment choice is not over. In a way, it just started, and is here to stay. Such debate can certainly bene¯t from more accurate and systematic information about the determinants of voting equipment use.
2) By learning about the determinants of voting equipment use across U.S.
counties, we can obtain more general insights on the adoption of innovation by public authorities. For decades all over the U.S. local authorities have quietly run a fascinating natural experiment on the adoption of technological innovation in vote-tallying. From it we may learn something useful about the way innovations in general are (or are not) adopted across di®erent jurisdictions.
Why do some counties use older voting machines while others use more updated ones? Vice-President Al Gore among others suggested that those di®er-ences re°ect economic inequality: \The old and cheap, outdated machinery is usually found in areas with populations that are of lower income, minorities, seniors on¯xed incomes." (Gore, 2000) The view that older machinery is used in poorer counties is intuitively appealing, and has been widely reported in the media. For example, according to The Economist (June 9, 2001, p. 32) \everybody knows that the worst voting machinery is concentrated in poor areas." Somewhat surprisingly, such widespread belief does not seem to be consistent with the data on the distribution of voting equipment types across counties. In Section 3 we show that, on average, machines of older types are not used in relatively poorer counties. When data on voting equipment from Election Data Services (EDS) are matched with the most recent census data, one¯nds that the median household income in counties using lever and punchcard machines (the older machinery) is higher than in counties using optical scanners or electronic machines (the newer machinery). Also, summary statistics do not provide prima facie evidence that machines of older types are disproportionately used in counties with larger minorities or older population.
In Section 3 we also present logit regressions with di®erent types of equipment as dependent variables. This more formal analysis is consistent with the patterns suggested by the summary statistics. Speci¯cally, we¯nd evidence against the hypothesis that lower income increases the probability of using lever or punchcard machines rather than optical scanners or electronic machines, controlling for other potential determinants of voting equipment choice. If anything, richer counties seem to be more likely to use machines of older type.
Is there a \paradox of chads"? Should we be surprised to¯nd out that many richer counties use older technology, such as punchcard machines, while a large number of relatively poorer ones have switched to more advanced machinery?
We think the apparent paradox has a simple economic explanation. Our explanation hinges on two points: 1) all other things equal, a richer county is more likely to adopt a more advanced technology, but 2) among all things that must be equal we should include the county's current technology.
If the richer county has already adopted a more advanced technology in the past, it will bene¯t less from adopting and even more advanced technology in the future, while the adoption of the newest technology will have the highest bene¯ts in counties that are still using much older technology. As a consequence, richer counties may be leapfrogged by poorer counties. Section 4 presents a simple model which is consistent with these ideas. The model is consistent with a positive relationship between current income and use of older machinery. However, the model predicts that, once past income has been controlled for, the relationship between current income and use of older machinery should be negative. Section 5 examines whether the available empirical evidence is consistent with our hypotheses. First, we show that between 1980 and 2000 the share of counties that used optical or electronic machines went from 1 percent to 49.1 percent.
The transition took place through reductions in the number of counties that used paper ballots (from 40.4 percent to 12.5 percent) or lever machines (from 36.4 percent to 14.7 percent). By contrast, the share of counties that used punchcard machines barely moved (19.1 versus 19.2) . This pattern is consistent with our story.
In order to provide a more direct and formal test of our hypothesis, in Section 5 we also present logit estimates using past values for income. The results provide support for our model. We¯nd that: 1) Income in 1969 has a positive e®ect on the probability of using older equipment in 1999. In the case of punchcards, such e®ect is one order of magnitude larger than the e®ect of 1989 income when one does not control for 1969 income.
2) When income in 1969 is included in the regression, the e®ect of income in 1989 becomes negative ( for punchcard machines) or insigni¯cant (for lever plus punchcard).
In other words, the positive correlation between most recent income and use of older equipment is explained by the positive correlation between most recent income and past income. When past income is explicitly taken into account, the e®ect of current income -as predicted by our model -becomes negative or insigni¯cant.
Hence our analysis provides a consistent explanation for the \paradox of chads." \Chads" are found in counties that used to be richer in the 1960s, when punchcard machines were adopted -and, therefore, on average, are still likely to be richer today. When past income is controlled for, a \nonparadoxical" negative relationship between present income and use of older, outdated equipment emerges.
In Section 6 we extend the analysis to explicitly include another important variable along with income: population size. We argue that, all other things equal, a larger population increases the probability of adopting more advanced voting technology. The aggregate cost of adopting a new technology includes a signi¯cant¯xed component, which is independent of size. Henceforth, cost per capita is decreasing in the size of a county. Moreover, bene¯ts from adopting more advanced technology may be positively related to total size (for example, the bene¯ts from speedy vote-tallying may be higher in larger counties). Does this imply that larger counties -controlling for income -will be more likely to use more advanced technology? No, for the same reasons why a higher income does not guarantee a better technology. Section 6 contains an empirical analysis of the relationship between historical levels of population and current usage of voting equipment. The results are consistent with our general point. The probability of using lever machines in 1999 is positively related to population in 1930 (when larger counties were more likely to adopt state-of-the-art lever machines), but negatively related to population in 1990, when larger counties were more likely to adopt more advanced electronic machines, other things being equal. By the same token, the probability of using punchcard machines is negatively related to population in 1930, but positively related to population in 1970, when punchcard machines were being adopted.
Finally, a word of caveat about the purpose and limits of our analysis. Our paper does not intend to assess whether the distribution of voting equipment in the 2000 election has resulted in the undercount of the votes cast by speci¯c groups (democrats, minorities, etc). Such analysis is beyond our goals and our data. Even further from our objectives is to join the legal and political controversy on the Florida recount, for which we are clearly unquali¯ed. Our study intends to contribute to the ongoing debate on voting equipment choice by making a separate point: cross-county di®erences in types of voting equipment -whatever implications they may have had for di®erent groups of voters in past elections -do not re°ect current economic inequality across U.S. counties. Rather, they are the complex result of a series of historical decisions a®ected by past values of income and population.
In summary, the strikingly heterogeneous distribution of voting equipment in the U.S. can be best understood as re°ecting an intriguing \archeology" of historical decisions and trends. In a way, voting equipment is like a time machine.
New York and Connecticut's antique lever machines mirrors the past economic and demographic preeminence of the Northeast. Punchcard machines in Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Miami witness the expansion of those regions after Second World War. The electronic machines of New Mexico speak about today's economic and demographic realities.
Types of voting equipment in the United States
As reported by Election Data System, as of April 1, 1999 , the 3141 U.S. counties used¯ve di®erent systems to count votes: 1) Paper ballots: 407 counties.
2) Lever machines: 476 counties.
3) Punchcard machines: 625 counties. 4) Optical scanners: 1231 counties.
5) Electronic machines: 261 counties
The remaining 141 counties used mixed systems.
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The paper ballot system is the oldest method.
6 It was¯rst adopted in Australia in 1856, and introduced in the U.S. in the second half of the 19th century. In its current form, the paper ballot system employs uniform o±cial ballots on which the names of all candidates are printed. Voters privately record their choices by marking the boxes next to the candidate they select and drop the voted ballot 5 Mixed systems are mainly found in those states, such as Massachusetts and Michigan, in which decisions over vote equipment are not taken by counties but by towns. 6 The historical information in this section has been obtained from the Federal Election Commission (www.fec.gov/elections.html). With votomatic cards, the locations at which holes may be punched are assigned 7 Imperfectly punched chads include \hanging chads" (one corner of the chad is hanging on the punchcard), \swinging chads" (two corners are attached to the card), and \pregnant chads" (a hole is punched through a fully attached chad).
numbers. With datavote cards the name of the candidate is printed on the ballot next to the hole to be punched. 8 After voters have punched their cards, ballots are fed into a computer vote-tabulating device.
Optical scanners recognize marks on paper through optical reading techniques.
Voters record their choices by¯lling in a rectangle, circle or oval. The tabulating device reads the votes using`dark mark logic' (i.e., by selecting the darkest mark within a given set). Optical scanned ballots have been adopted in the U.S. since issued as part of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, has used \resid-ual votes" (i.e., ballots cast for which no presidential preference was counted) as yardstick for \reliability," and has concluded that paper ballots, lever machines and optical scanners are more \reliable" (i.e., less likely to produce uncounted ballots) than punchcard machines and electronic machines. In fact, the oldest system of all, paper ballots, seems to be the most reliable. We will return on these issues in Section 4, when we model the adoption of voting equipment by county o±cials.
3 Determinants of voting equipment use: a preliminary analysis
As a¯rst step towards understanding the determinants of voting equipment choice, we consider the following county characteristics:
2) Population (1990).
3) % Population 65 years or older (1990).
4) % Population classi¯ed as minorities (1990).
5) % Population 25 percent or older with Bachelor's degree or higher (1990).
6) Local government revenues per capita (1986-97).
The summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 1 .
Average median household income in 1989 was $28,817 in counties with lever machines, $30,584 in counties with punchcard machines, $28,124 in counties with optical scanners; and $27,992 in counties with electronic machines. That is, lever and punchcard systems are used in counties with incomes above the average median income for all counties. By contrast, median income in counties that use optical or electronic is (slightly) below average. The lowest income is found in counties that use paper ballots ($24,799 Table 2e we show logit estimates when we aggregate lever and punchcard machines. In Table 2f we show logit estimates
when we ask what is the probability of using lever and punchcard machines versus optical and electronic (that tis, we drop paper ballots from the sample).
Overall, the logit estimates tend to con¯rm the regularities one can detect from the summary statistics: a) paper ballots are used in poorer and smaller counties.
b) we can reject the hypothesis that a lower income increases the probability of using older machines (levers and punchcards) rather than newer machines (optical and electronic). If anything, there seem to be some evidence for the opposite correlation. c) analogously, one can reject that a larger percentage of minorities or seniors in the population is associated with a higher probability of using lever machines and/or punchcard machines.
d) higher population is associated with the use of older machines.
Does the lack of a negative correlation between income and older equipment mean that economic considerations are not relevant for the choice of voting equipment? Not at all. In the following section we develop an economic model that can help shed some light on the relationship between income and voting equipment choice.
A model of voting equipment choice
In this section we present a stylized model of voting equipment choice. In order to present the main insights in the simplest possible way, we assume only two periods and three types of equipment. Extensions to allow for a larger (in¯nite)
number of periods and a larger (in¯nite) number of equipment types are available from the authors. Also, we will assume a deterministic environment. Extensions that allow for uncertainty are also available from the authors.
In words, our model works as follows. Suppose that two counties -identical in everything except for income -are using technology A, when a better technology B becomes available. 11 Then, the richer county is more likely to adopt B, because its opportunity cost of adopting the innovation is lower (as long as utility is concave in income, the marginal bene¯ts from alternative uses of income are lower in a richer counties). Now suppose that, after a while, a new technology C, better than B, becomes available. Which county will be more likely to adopt it? The richer county, which is now using B, or the poorer county, which is still using A? It depends. While the opportunity cost of adopting C is lower in the richer county, the bene¯ts from adopting C are also lower. By assumption, switching from B to C will not give as high a gain as the more dramatic switch from A to 11 As discussed below, terms such as \better," \costs," and \bene¯ts" refer to the objective function of the relevant decision maker, the county's local o±cial. More idealistically, one may interpret the utility of the county as equal to the utility of the county's median voter or representative citizen.
C. In other words, the net bene¯ts from adopting the new technology C depend on a county's current technology. All other things equal, the less advanced is the county's current technology, the higher are the bene¯ts from switching to the most advanced technology C. If the di®erence between \bene¯t e®ect" (larger in poorer county) and \cost e®ect" (larger in richer counties) is high enough, we may see a large number of richer counties \leapfrogged" by relatively poorer counties.
12 Nonetheless, our framework implies that, when controlling for past income levels, a higher income today is associated with a lower probability of using older equipment.
More formally, consider a two-period model. In each period, counties can use \type 0" equipment (paper ballots) at no cost. In period 1, a county can adopt \type 1" equipment (\old machines"). In period 2, a county can adopt \type 2" equipment (\new machines"). The quality of period t equipment is denoted by x t (with x 2 > x 2 > x 0 , where x 0 is the quality of paper ballots). The utility of county i's decision-maker in period t is given by
where q i t denotes the quality of voting machines in county i at time t, y i t is county 12 The possibility of leapfrogging in the adoption of innovation is familiar to students of industrial organization, economic development, and international economics. For example, see Aghion and Howitt (2000) and Brezis et al. (1993 County i's decision maker maximizes
13 For simplicity, we assume that the costs of adopting type-t equipment are the same for all counties. The model can be easily extended to allow for di®erent costs per capita across counties of di®erent size. We will return to this extension later.
14 We abstract from \running costs," which could be easily added without much gain of insights.
where 0 ¯ 1 is the subjective discount factor.
A brief discussion of the objective function is in order. Our interpretation is that, historically, decisions have been taken by local o±cials who have maximized their own utility function. What objectives have been pursued by such agents?
Certainly not maximization of accuracy. While expert evaluations of the relative performance of di®erent voting equipment have focused mainly on \reliability" (minimization of \residual votes," \spoiled ballots," etc.), it seems unlikely that, before the Florida crisis, accuracy played a paramount role in actual decisions over voting machinery.
15 If \reliability" had been the key goal of local o±cials, one would be hard pressed to explain why they bothered to adopt newer machines at all, when paper ballots seem to provide the most reliable, accurate system available (Ansolabehere et al., 2001) . Either local o±cials were systematically mistaken on the characteristics of the machines they adopted, or they were willing to trade o® reliability with other bene¯ts from more advanced machines. 16 In particular, voting machines are, above all, labor-saving devices: they make voting procedures (especially vote-counting) quicker and easier. And the labor saved tends to belong to county o±cials themselves and their assistants. 17
15 \Reliability" as low \residual vote" should not be confused with the minimization of actual machine failures, which may well be a high priority for local o±cials. In fact, state and federal voting equipment certi¯cations impose tight standards for machine failure rates. As pointed out by Ansolabehere et al. (2001) , human factor (interaction of voter and machine) rather than pure mechanical failure seems to drive much of \error" in voting.
16 A third possibility is that current analyses of voting equipment reliability do not provide correct estimates of relative accuracy.
17 Voters may also bene¯t from shorter lines if voting procedures are speeded up by the machines.
When priority is given to the speed and convenience of vote counting, mechanized lever machines can be viewed as \progress" with respect to paper ballots, computerized punchcard machines as \progress" with respect to lever systems, etc.
18 More generally, one can assume that innovation in the voting equipment industry is targeted to the satisfaction of its costumers (the county o±cials), and that, on average, successful (i.e., adopted) innovations must have provided higher utility to such customers. 19 All things considered, it seems reasonable to assume that, from the perspective of local o±cials, \newer" voting equipment has been perceived as \better" equipment.
In this section we will solve tour model's simple optimization problem for the case¯= 0.
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Since S(:) is increasing and V (:) is increasing and concave, it is immediate to obtain the following:
Proposition 1
In period 1, a county i will adopt voting machines of type 1 if and only if its 18 Historically, the shift from paper ballots to lever machines might also have been motivated as an attempt by higher o±cials to reduce voting fraud.
19 An explicit analysis of the supply side of the voting equipment industry is beyond the scope of this paper.
20¯= 0 is a realistic assumption for our model: voting equipment is chosen by local o±-cials with horizons that are unlikely to exceed their terms in o±ce, while, as we have seen, the introduction of new types of voting equipment has taken place over long intervals. The straightforward generalization for 0 <¯ 0 is available upon request. Not surprisingly, the main e®ect of a nonzero¯is to increase the fraction of counties that switch to type-1 machines in period 1. income is higher than y ¤ 1 , which is implicitly de¯ned by the following equation:
That is, the richer counties in period 1 will adopt type-1 machineries, while the poorer counties will not.
For example, if V (:) = ln(:), we have
Since S(:) is increasing, the bene¯ts from adopting type-2 technology, ceteris paribus, are higher for those counties that have not adopted type-1 technology in period 1. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 2
In period 2, a county with q i 1 = x 0 will adopt machines of type 2 if and only if its income is above y ¤ 2 , which is implicitly de¯ned by the following equation:
while a county with q i 1 = x 1 will adopt machines of type 2 if and only if its income is above y ¤¤ 2 , which is implicitly de¯ned by the following equation:
It is immediate to verify that y
As shown in Figure 1 , when income is correlated across the two periods, a high enough gap between y In the following section we will use our simple model's insights to investigate the relationship between present and past income and voting equipment usage.
History matters: the role of past income
In this section we will investigate whether the empirical evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that the current distribution of voting equipment use is the outcome of historical decisions. In order to provide a more direct and formal test of our hypothesis, we calculate logit estimates using past values for income. The results are reported in Tables 6a-6b , and provide strong support for our model. In table 6a we aggregate lever and punchcard (as our \type-1 technology") and obtain the following results:
1) Income in 1969 has a positive e®ect on the probability of using lever or punchcard machines in 1999. Such e®ect is larger than the e®ect of 1989 income in our previous logit estimation (table 2f) , when we did not control for 1969 income.
2) When income in 1969 is included in the regression, the e®ect of 1989 becomes insigni¯cant.
When we consider the probability of using punchcard machines alone (table   7b ) we obtain even stronger results, as one may expect from the fact that 1969 income is within the time frame in which punchcard machines were adopted, while lever machines were adopted in many counties before Second World War.
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In particular, we have 1) Income in 1969 has a positive e®ect on the probability of using punchcards in 1999. In fact, such e®ect is one order of magnitude larger than the e®ect of 1989 income in our previous logit estimation (table 2c) .
2) When income in 1969 is included in the regression, the e®ect of income in 1989 becomes negative.
In other words, the positive correlation between most recent income and use of punchcards is completely due to the positive correlation between most recent income and past income (i.e., the county's income when punchcards were actually adopted). When past income is explicitly taken into account, the e®ect of current income -as expected in our model -becomes negative By taking explicitly into account the role of historical income, we can provide a factually consistent story about the relationship between income and the use of di®erent voting equipment. Our story provides a solution for the \paradox of chads": \chads" are not found among poorer counties but among counties that used to be richer in 1969 -and, therefore, are still likely to be relatively richer in the 1980s and 1990s. But when past income is controlled for, a \nonparadox-ical" negative relationship between present income and use of older punchcard equipment emerges. is not the only determinant. In this section the analysis is extended to include another key variable: population size. We argue that, all other things equal, a larger population increases the probability of adopting more advanced voting technology. The aggregate cost of adopting a new technology includes an important¯xed component, which is independent of size. These¯xed costs stem from numerous sources, including the indivisibility of machines and the existence of large¯xed costs in initial training and \adaptation." 22 Henceforth, cost per capita is decreasing in the size of a county. 23 Formally, we can expand the model in Section 3 by assuming that the costs per capita of adopting technology of type t in a county with population equal to N t are given by
where f t is a¯xed cost. Moreover, bene¯ts from adopting more advanced technology may be positively related to total size (for example, the bene¯ts from 22 See O±ce of Federal Elections and National Bureau of Standards (1975) . 23 This can be viewed as an application of the standard idea that the per capita cost of public goods should be decreasing in size. For a recent discussion of this issue, see Alesina and Spolaore (2001) .
speed in vote-tallying may be higher in larger counties). Hence, our previous speci¯cation can be extended to include population as an argument in the S (.) function, e.g.,
Does our extension to population size imply that currently larger counties -controlling for income -will be more likely to use more advanced technology? No, for the same reasons why a currently higher income does not guarantee a better technology. What matters is population size when the di®erent types of equipment were introduced. Since we have data for population before Second World War (while income data is only available from 959), we can disaggregate lever machines and punchcard machines, and test whether their use today is related to past values of population as predicted by our model. Tables 7a-7b show logit estimates when past values of population are included as explanatory variables.
The results con¯rm our general message. As predicted by our model, the probability of using lever machines in 1999 is positively related to population in 1930, but negatively related to population in 1990. Controlling for today's population size, countries that were larger in 1930, when lever machines were state-of-theart, were more likely to have adopted them. But, controlling for 1930 size, a larger size in 1990 means a higher chance of having replaced lever machines with more updated equipment by 1999. By the same token, the probability of using punchcard machines is negatively related to population in 1930, but positively related to population in 1970.
The extension of the model to include population size adds realism and explanatory power to our basic framework without changing the central insights.
For example, the role of population size can also help explain an additional fact, documented in Ansolabehere et al. (2001) : counties that abandoned paper ballots were more likely to adopt optical scanners, while counties that abandoned lever machines were more likely to adopt electronic machines. Electronic machines have much higher¯xed costs than optical scanners (which, by contrast, have higher variable costs because they require expensive special paper). Hence, we should expect that counties with larger population would adopt electronic machines rather than optical scanners. Since larger counties are also more likely to have used lever machines rather than paper ballots in the past, a pattern lever to electronic/paper to optical is soon established. Other extensions could focus on the role of local public¯nance across di®er-ent jurisdictions. In our speci¯cation we simply assume that the relevant decision maker obtains utility from the county (average or median) \income." In reality, the relationship between a county's income and the resources available to local o±cials is also mediated by institutional mechanisms and constraints that may di®er across jurisdictions. At the empirical level, they are partly captured by the independent e®ect of current local government revenues per capita in our regressions. The analysis of the e®ects of these variables from a historical perspective is also matter for future inquiry.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have documented the relationship between usage of di®erent types of voting equipment and county characteristics. Contrary to widespread belief, machines of older types are not used in relatively poorer counties. We have provided a stylized model in which the adoption of new voting equipment depends on a county's income, population, and existing type of equipment at the time the new technology is introduced. We have successfully tested numerous implications of our model. In particular, as predicted by our theory, when we control for the relevant decision variables (income and population size) at the time in which the older technologies were state-of-the-art, the e®ects of more recent income and population become negative or insigni¯cant.
Overall, we have found evidence that voting equipment adoption in the U.S.
has been characterized by signi¯cant \leapfrogging," with the latest technology being adopted by counties that had not adopted the previous state-of-the-art equipment.
These¯ndings may shed new light on the debate over the causes and consequences of voting equipment choice in the U.S., and correct some misconceptions that have colored such discussions.
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Table 2g
Lever/Punch (with paper counties dropped)
(i)
(ii) (iii) (iv)
Median Income 1989
.0000225*** (6.08e-06) .000043*** (9.04e-06)
.0000225 (.0000181)
.000043* (.0000251) Population 1990 All results with mixed counties dropped. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis beneath the coefficient estimates. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. All results with mixed counties dropped. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis beneath the coefficient estimates. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. -1263.0142 -1208.7098 -1263.0142 -1208 .7098 Number of observations = 2946 Columns (i) and (ii) report standard logit estimates. Columns (iii) and (iv) report logit estimation results using Huber/White estimator of variance with clustering by state. 
